Home · Insights · Red Sea & Gulf
Yemen's Government Said in October It Had Cut the Houthis Off From the World's Most Fought-Over Strait. Five Weeks Later It Walked Away, and the Houthis Took Perim Island Back.
Yemen's Saudi-backed Southern Armed Forces announced on 15 November that they were withdrawing from Dhubab Airfield and the wider Bab el-Mandeb area to concentrate on defending Aden, according to Reuters, NBC News and Xinhua, a retreat that handed the Iran-aligned Houthi movement renewed control of the Ras Menhali peninsula and Perim Island, the two positions that dominate the strait's southern mouth, according to Maritime Executive and Al Jazeera. The withdrawal ends a six-week government counteroffensive that had recaptured Dhubab and reached the coastal highway in early October, five weeks after Houthi forces first seized Perim outright in September, a seizure FIKIR Institute covered at the time; neither side's current hold on the islands has been independently verified. Djibouti, roughly 160 kilometres across the water and host to Camp Lemonnier, warned in July against any unilateral toll on strait shipping and has separately told Al Jazeera Arabic it fears the war spilling into the Horn of Africa, while the Africa Center for Strategic Studies counts a dozen Houthi attacks or attempted attacks on Red Sea shipping since July alongside a documented surge in Gulf of Aden piracy it calls unlikely to be coincidental.
FIKIR Institute · 19 November 2026 · 9 min read

Audio reading is ready.
Abstract: Yemen's Southern Armed Forces, aligned with the Saudi-backed internationally recognized government, announced on 15 November 2026 that they were withdrawing from Dhubab Airfield and the surrounding Bab el-Mandeb area in southwestern Taiz governorate, citing the priority of defending the temporary capital, Aden, and reinforcing front lines elsewhere, according to NBC News, Reuters and Xinhua. The move reverses a government counteroffensive, reported by Maritime Executive on 5 October as "Operation Dawn of Yemen," that had recaptured the Dhubab airstrip and pushed to the coastal N2 highway, cutting off Houthi forces on the Ras Menhali peninsula and Perim Island, known locally as Mayyun, the two positions that dominate the southern entrance to the Red Sea. With the government force gone, Maritime Executive reported on 15 November and Al Jazeera on 16 November that Houthi fighters are now free to reoccupy both positions, undoing the government's October gains and restoring, for the second time since September, the same leverage over the strait that FIKIR Institute reported the Houthis had first seized on 11 September. DataPortuaria's 16 November coverage cautioned that the extent of the renewed Houthi hold has not been independently verified, and Reuters said it could not confirm the precise state of fighting on the ground. The reversal unfolds alongside a broader regional deterioration FIKIR Institute has tracked since late August: a documented rise in Gulf of Aden piracy that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies says has coincided too closely with the Houthi campaign to be coincidental, and a Djiboutian government that has twice this year, in July and again in September, said publicly that it fears the Yemeni war spilling onto the African side of the strait.
A six-week counteroffensive ends where it began
The ground that changed hands on 15 November had changed hands twice before in the space of two months. Houthi forces first seized Perim Island outright on 11 September 2026, a move Euronews and Marine Link both described as giving the group effective control of the Bab el-Mandeb for the first time, and which FIKIR Institute covered the same week as the moment a 14-country coalition built to escort ships past Houthi missiles instead watched the Houthis take the strait those ships sail through. The internationally recognized government's Southern Armed Forces answered with "Operation Dawn of Yemen," an offensive Maritime Executive reported on 5 October had recaptured the Dhubab airstrip and reached the coastal N2 highway, a position its own statements described as cutting off Houthi forces remaining on Ras Menhali and Perim from resupply. That gain held for barely five weeks. Xinhua's 15 November reporting traced the reversal to a Houthi push through Lahj governorate that seized positions overlooking the routes to both Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb, while Eastern Herald and The National reported that renewed Houthi pressure around Taiz had separately undermined the coastal campaign's supply lines. The Southern Armed Forces' own statement, quoted by NBC News, framed the pullback from Dhubab and the Bab el-Mandeb area as a choice: "the priority of securing the capital, Aden, and the neighbouring governorates, as well as strengthening the front lines and addressing existing threats." Whatever the internal balance between choice and necessity, the practical effect, as Maritime Executive's 15 November report put it, is that the Houthis are now "free to once again occupy" Ras Menhali and Perim.
What possession of an island actually buys the Houthis
Perim's military value is not abstract. Maritime Executive's analysis argues that holding the island, rather than merely threatening the strait with missiles and drones from the Yemeni mainland, lets Houthi forces use armed small boats to close on and board passing vessels, a materially different and more coercive capability than stand-off strikes. The same analysis raises a possibility with direct commercial consequence: that the Houthis may come to see control of the strait as a revenue source in its own right, drawing the explicit comparison to the transit fees Egypt charges ships using the Suez Canal. FDD's analysis of the same reversal frames the stakes in territorial rather than commercial terms, describing Houthi forces as having retaken the strait and advanced toward Aden itself, a reading that would make the Bab el-Mandeb reversal a leading indicator of pressure on the government's seat of power rather than a contained maritime story. No outlet reviewed for this analysis reports the Southern Armed Forces disputing that characterization, and Reuters' own coverage notes only that government forces have relocated to secure positions further from the coast, not that they intend a near-term return to Dhubab.
A second chokepoint under pressure while Hormuz is already disrupted
The timing compounds an existing problem rather than introducing a new one. Multiple outlets covering the 15 November withdrawal noted that it hands the Houthis renewed leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb at a moment when Iran's parallel conflict has already disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning two of the world's most important maritime chokepoints face simultaneous, if separately caused, pressure on transit security. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in a spotlight analysis covering the period since July, counts twelve Houthi attacks or attempted attacks on commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea, a figure that predates the 15 November reversal and that the Center expects the renewed Houthi position on Perim to extend rather than resolve, given that a group capable of boarding vessels from a held island has a wider set of coercive options than one relying on missiles alone.
Djibouti's warning, Somalia's rerouted trade, and the piracy FIKIR Institute has already documented
The strait's security is not a question Yemen's war answers on its own terms; it is also a question for the Horn of Africa states that sit across the water from it. Djibouti's government said on 30 July, in a statement reported by Al Jazeera and Dawan Africa, that it would oppose any unilateral attempt by a party to the Yemeni war to impose tolls or taxes on strait shipping, and reserved the right to respond through diplomatic, legal and security channels, alone or with partners. Djibouti Arabic-language officials went further in September, telling Al Jazeera Arabic that they feared the Yemeni escalation spilling into the Horn of Africa given that the fighting sits roughly 160 kilometres from a country hosting several foreign military bases, including the United States' Camp Lemonnier, and that a Houthi-controlled island facing Djibouti's own coast would make the war's effects felt on the African side regardless of whether a single shot crossed the water. Somalia's exposure has so far been commercial rather than military: the Associated Press reported on 13 September that Somali importers were actively rerouting trade away from the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz disruptions, with Mogadishu's seaport director confirming the port had taken its own countermeasures and at least one importer shipping sugar directly from Sri Lanka to avoid the strait altogether. The same period has coincided with a piracy resurgence off Somalia's coast that FIKIR Institute examined in detail in its 13 November analysis of the Indian Navy's rescue of the hijacked fishing vessel Azini off Puntland, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, citing at least 23 Gulf of Aden piracy incidents since April, states plainly that the concurrent surge of Houthi missile strikes and Somali piracy activity is "unlikely to be coincidental." A 14-country Saudi-convened security framework, which different outlets have named the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance and the Multinational Maritime Security Alliance and dated variously to July and August 2026, counts Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Egypt among its members on paper; no outlet reviewed for this analysis reports that framework intervening in, or even issuing a statement on, the 15 November reversal at Bab el-Mandeb.
What to watch
First, whether any independent monitor, a UN panel, a flag-state navy or a commercial insurer, corroborates the extent of the Houthis' renewed hold on Ras Menhali and Perim, since DataPortuaria's caution that the advance "remains unconfirmed" is, for now, the most careful public assessment available. Second, whether Houthi forces attempt the small-boat boarding tactics Maritime Executive's analysis warns possession of Perim enables, which would mark a qualitative escalation beyond the missile and drone strikes that have defined the campaign since July. Third, whether Djibouti's government, having twice this year flagged its fear of spillover, takes any concrete step, diplomatic, legal or naval, beyond the statements it issued in July and September, particularly if Houthi small-boat activity begins to approach the African side of the strait rather than remaining confined to Yemeni waters. Fourth, whether the Saudi-convened 14-country maritime framework, whatever its settled name, issues any response to a reversal that directly concerns the waterway it was built to secure, given that no outlet reviewed for this analysis found one as of this writing.
Policy implications
For Yemen's internationally recognized government, losing ground its own October offensive was named to claim, "Operation Dawn," within five weeks, without independent confirmation of exactly how or why the position collapsed beyond its own statement about prioritizing Aden, risks the same credibility problem FIKIR Institute has flagged in other combatants' unverified claims this month: a reported gain that cannot outlast a single Houthi counter-push is a weak foundation for the international backing, Saudi and Emirati material support chief among it, that the government's war effort depends on. For the Houthis, a second seizure of the same ground in two months, if it holds, strengthens the case that controlling the Bab el-Mandeb is now a durable rather than episodic Houthi capability, one that a 14-country naval coalition and a Saudi-led coastal offensive have both so far failed to reverse for more than five weeks at a stretch. For Djibouti, the gap between its own public warnings in July and September and any concrete response to the actual reversal of control in November suggests a Horn of Africa state whose stated fear of spillover has so far outpaced its demonstrated tools for preventing it, even as its exposure, geographic, military and economic, remains the most direct of any African state's. For Somalia, a trade community already rerouting shipments around Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz disruptions and a piracy problem the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has linked to the same campaign, the practical consequence of a Houthi-controlled strait at Bab el-Mandeb's southern mouth is a continuation, not a resolution, of the operating conditions Somali importers have spent the past two months adapting to. For Washington and Riyadh, a reversal that neither government has publicly addressed as of this writing, while both remain consumed by Iran's parallel disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, illustrates a wider pattern FIKIR Institute has observed across the region this autumn: security guarantees issued at speed, a 14-nation coalition convened in weeks, an offensive launched and named within days of a loss, that have not yet proven durable against the forces they were built to contain.
Related Analysis
- A House Republican Wants to Pay Ethiopia and Eritrea Not to Go to War, With Soybeans and Mining Rights. He's Open About the Other Reason: Keeping China Out of Their Minerals.
- Somalia Gave the UAE's Ambassador 72 Hours to Leave, Accusing Abu Dhabi of an 'Open Invasion' of Its Sovereignty. Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland Have Already Said the UAE Isn't Going Anywhere.
- Sudan's Army Says It Broke a Two-Year Siege of a Regional Capital. It Made the Same Claim in February 2025, and the Offensive That Did It This Time Has Already Killed at Least 13 Civilians.
- The US Just Walked Away From Its Main Somalia Airfield, Blaming a Broken Runway. It Is Leaving Six Weeks Before the Entire Coalition Fighting Al-Shabaab Loses Its Funding and Its Two Biggest Armies.