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A House Republican Wants to Pay Ethiopia and Eritrea Not to Go to War, With Soybeans and Mining Rights. He's Open About the Other Reason: Keeping China Out of Their Minerals.

Rep. Jim Baird, an Indiana Republican who sits on the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Africa subcommittee, has introduced two bills, the Ethiopia SPARK Act and the Eritrea PILLAR Act, offering both countries formal trade talks, wider US market access for their exports, American farm goods and machinery, and cooperation developing critical minerals, gold, silver, copper, zinc, iron ore, potash, natural gas and oil among them, contingent on steps toward lasting peace, according to The Hill, which first reported the draft bills on 19 November, and Addis Standard and allAfrica's coverage the following day. Baird's own stated rationale ties the offer explicitly to great-power competition: "East Africa has tremendous potential, with the benefit of limited influence from America's adversaries, like China," he said, according to the same reporting. The bills surface in the same week Reuters and the conflict monitor ACLED reported Ethiopian and Eritrean forces massing troops along their shared border and trading artillery and drone strikes near Badme, a dynamic The Hill's own framing describes as the two countries appearing "poised for all-out war." Neither Addis Ababa nor Asmara had responded to the proposal as of this writing, and the bills' full legislative text had not yet appeared on Congress's own tracking site.

FIKIR Institute · 21 November 2026 · 9 min read

A House Republican Wants to Pay Ethiopia and Eritrea Not to Go to War, With Soybeans and Mining Rights. He's Open About the Other Reason: Keeping China Out of Their Minerals.

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Abstract: Representative Jim Baird, an Indiana Republican who sits on the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Africa as well as the House Agriculture Committee, has drafted two bills, the Ethiopia SPARK Act and the Eritrea PILLAR Act, that would offer both countries formal trade negotiations, expanded US market access, American agricultural exports including corn, soybeans, soybean meal and livestock feed, farm machinery and technical assistance, and cooperation developing critical minerals, gold, silver, copper, zinc, iron ore, potash, cement and limestone, natural gas and oil among them, along with access to port infrastructure, according to The Hill, which reported the draft bills on 19 November 2026, and Addis Standard's and allAfrica's coverage the following day. Every incentive on offer is explicitly conditional: both bills tie the trade and minerals package to Ethiopia and Eritrea taking verifiable steps toward lasting peace with each other. Baird's own framing of the bills leaves little ambiguity about their second purpose. "East Africa has tremendous potential, with the benefit of limited influence from America's adversaries, like China," he said, according to the reporting, a line consistent with a March 2026 op-ed in which Baird argued that roughly 90 percent of global critical-mineral processing is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and called decoupling from that dependency a congressional priority. The proposal lands inside an active crisis rather than a quiet one: the same week The Hill reported the draft legislation, Reuters and the conflict monitor ACLED reported Ethiopian and Eritrean forces massing along their shared border and exchanging artillery and drone strikes near Badme, the town whose contested status started the two countries' 1998-2000 war. The Hill's own description of that backdrop, that Ethiopia and Eritrea appear "poised for all-out war," is the stated occasion for Baird's bills, though no outlet reviewed for this analysis records either government's reaction to the specific legislative offer, and the bills' full text had not surfaced on Congress's own tracking site as of this writing.

Soybeans and mining rights as a peace incentive

The structure of Baird's two bills, as described to The Hill, is transactional rather than declaratory: rather than condemning either side or threatening sanctions, the Ethiopia SPARK Act and the Eritrea PILLAR Act are drafted as parallel offers, one per country, of concrete economic benefits in exchange for measurable progress toward peace. Addis Standard's account of the drafts describes an offer of formal trade negotiations and expanded access to American agricultural exports, specifically corn, soybeans, soybean meal and livestock feed, alongside farm machinery, agricultural research partnerships and technical assistance. The Hill's own reporting adds the minerals component: US cooperation developing a list of resources present in both countries, including gold, silver, copper, zinc, iron ore, potash, cement, limestone, natural gas and oil, along with access to port infrastructure, a provision with obvious relevance to Eritrea's Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa. Both allAfrica's and Addis Standard's coverage describe the bills as shared with reporters in draft form rather than filed in final text, and allAfrica noted specifically that the legislation had not yet appeared through Congress's own public tracking portal, a gap this analysis could not independently resolve as of this writing. Baird's own post on X stated simply, "Today, I introduced two bills," without the qualifying detail the press coverage attaches to their draft status, a discrepancy between the congressman's own characterization and the reporting on it that this analysis also could not resolve.

The China angle Baird did not try to hide

Unlike many congressional Africa initiatives that frame economic engagement primarily in humanitarian or developmental terms, Baird's own stated rationale for the bills foregrounds great-power competition. "East Africa has tremendous potential, with the benefit of limited influence from America's adversaries, like China," he said, according to The Hill's and Addis Standard's reporting, language that frames the trade and minerals package less as aid to two war-threatened countries than as a bid to secure US access to their resources before Beijing does. That framing is consistent with Baird's public record on the subject: in a March 2026 opinion piece, he wrote that roughly 90 percent of critical-mineral processing capacity worldwide sits under Chinese Communist Party control and argued that reducing US dependence on that processing chain should be a standing congressional priority, a position that predates the current Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis by months. China's own ties to both countries are real and documented elsewhere: Beijing operates a naval and intelligence facility in neighboring Djibouti that CSIS reported in September 2026 had been upgraded with signals-intelligence equipment, and its special representative for African affairs, Liu Xianfa, toured the Horn of Africa, including a 10 November meeting with Djibouti's president, in the same month Baird's bills were reported. Neither Ethiopia's nor Eritrea's trade relationship with China specifically was detailed in the coverage reviewed for this analysis, leaving the scale of Chinese economic presence Baird's bills are implicitly competing against unquantified in the reporting itself.

A trade offer arriving as the two countries mass troops, not de-escalate

The timing of Baird's proposal is inseparable from the military situation it is meant to defuse. FIKIR Institute has separately documented the Badme-area artillery and drone exchanges that began in mid-November, and the same week The Hill reported Baird's draft bills, Reuters cited the conflict monitor ACLED reporting that Ethiopian drones had struck likely Eritrean positions near Badme on 12 November and that Eritrean forces had returned artillery fire, while both governments were separately reported to be massing additional forces along the border further afield near Rama. Foreign ministers meeting in Paris on 11 November, a diplomatic intervention FIKIR Institute covered at the time, expressed "great concern" over the escalation and called for "maximum restraint," and five Senate Democrats wrote Secretary of State Rubio on 10 November urging a halt to new US arms sales to Ethiopia and a commitment that any Ethiopian seizure of Eritrea's port of Assab be taken "off the table," an appeal FIKIR Institute also covered. Baird's bills, introduced or drafted in the days immediately after that diplomatic flurry, represent a materially different kind of intervention from either the Paris statement or the Senate Democrats' letter: rather than warning against escalation or restricting the inputs to it, they attempt to make de-escalation pay. Whether an incentive structure built around soybean exports and mining concessions can compete with the territorial and sovereignty grievances, over Badme, over Assab, over Eritrea's alleged backing of Tigrayan rebels, that have driven both countries to the brink is a question neither bill, on the reporting available, attempts to answer directly.

A Red Sea opening the administration has already tested once

Baird's bills are not Washington's first recent attempt to use economic leverage, rather than pressure, on Eritrea specifically. The Trump administration allowed a 2021 sanctions program targeting Eritrea's ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice, the Eritrean Defense Forces, the Red Sea Trading Corporation and the Hidri Trust, along with a sanctions designation on presidential economic adviser Hagos Ghebrehiwet, to lapse on 18 September 2026, with the State Department saying the move was intended "to advance US regional interests" in the Red Sea, according to Al Jazeera, the Boston Globe and Semafor's reporting at the time. Eritrea's information ministry welcomed that move, calling the sanctions it replaced unwarranted. That September sanctions relief and Baird's November trade bills share a basic premise, that economic normalization with Asmara serves US interests in Red Sea shipping security more than continued isolation does, even as the same administration's State Department has separately engaged the Ethiopia-Eritrea military escalation diplomatically rather than economically. Whether Baird's bills were coordinated with the State Department's own Eritrea outreach or represent a parallel, congressionally driven track is not addressed in any reporting reviewed for this analysis.

What to watch

First, whether the Ethiopia SPARK Act and Eritrea PILLAR Act are formally introduced with the House Clerk and assigned bill numbers, resolving the discrepancy between Baird's own "today, I introduced two bills" post and the press coverage describing them as still in draft form as of 19-20 November. Second, whether either the Ethiopian or Eritrean government issues any public response to the specific proposal, as opposed to the general diplomatic statements each has made about the Badme fighting and the broader crisis. Third, whether the State Department or the White House endorses, distances itself from, or simply does not engage with a congressional Africa initiative that explicitly frames trade incentives as a tool for displacing Chinese influence, particularly given the administration's own September decision to lift Eritrea sanctions on different, Red-Sea-security grounds. Fourth, whether the bills attract co-sponsors on either the Agriculture or Foreign Affairs committees, which would signal whether Baird's approach has broader support as a legislative response to the crisis beyond his own initiative.

Policy implications

For Ethiopia, a bill offering expanded US agricultural market access and critical-minerals cooperation arrives as Addis Ababa simultaneously faces the Senate Democrats' push to halt new US arms sales over the same conflict, giving the administration's Africa policy two potentially contradictory congressional tracks, one restrictive, one incentive-based, operating on the same crisis at the same time. For Eritrea, Baird's bill extends the logic of September's sanctions relief, treating economic engagement rather than pressure as the more effective lever, though neither that relief nor the new bill has yet been tested against Asmara's actual conduct at the Badme front, where Eritrea has denied Ethiopian accusations of cross-border incursions. For China, explicitly named as the rationale for both bills, the proposal is a notable instance of a member of Congress arguing openly that a Horn of Africa peace initiative should double as a great-power-competition tool, a framing that, if it shapes how the trade incentives are eventually negotiated, could make Ethiopian and Eritrean officials weigh US mineral and infrastructure partnerships as much against their relationships with Beijing as against each other. For the broader US policy process, a legislative branch initiative offering substantive economic incentives for peace, introduced the same week the executive branch's own diplomats were separately voicing "great concern" in Paris, illustrates a Horn of Africa policy response distributed across multiple US institutions without, on the evidence available, a single coordinated strategy tying the arms-sales question, the sanctions question and the trade-incentive question together.

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